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Olusegun Obasanjo's Policy Scoresheet: 
Challenge of Leadership and Continuity 
Introduction 
By 
Sheriff Folarin* 
One pertinent dilemma central to Afnca and ~1gena 's 
slow development or lack of it. has been the challenge of continuity 
of leadership. An African political science scholar once desc1ibed 
this phenomenal setback to development as the ··ab inilio ·· 
syndrome. namely a situation in which one rulcrship after another. 
see1ng no reason v. hy he should contmuc from \\here the 
predecessor stopped. dismantles everything and starts all O\er 
again. leavmg no stone untumed. The policies are overhauled for 
no reason , v. nh each rulershipcommitting huge fortunes to restal1 
a social engineering process that"" as hitherto on good course. 
Such wastage, more ev ident during the era of so ldiers In 
government, cannot be quantified In naira and kobo. This is\\ h) 
Nigeria and Africa are so backward. 
The Civilians are no less affected by th1 s syndrome. A 
close observation of curTent electionee1ing campaigns. sho"' !>an 
*Sheri ff Folartn 1s "1th the Department of Policy and Strateg~<.: Stud1es/ 
International Relations. Covenant Un1versity, Canaan land, Ota. Nigcn;~ 
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. d'/~ll0.r.chc of·'prorn~xs·· ci" u:x!cing \' h.ltt1i!..' ru1J:13 r·';; i;- h !.'>done. 
v. i:110ut po:nting cu: \he blsis fer 1ha~; o: :··::i -~··~, iv '~ -~kill;!\\ hclh•:r 
:t i:::. an ovcrn;Juling that i~. needed 'Jr imp:O\; ::g 1111 currc:ll cfr"u; t·; 
That 1s how Jt siarts. Fo:t) -seven yt::w; J::,l '' e r1rc y~t :o take u!f 
hc·cause of discontinuity in ieDclership programmes. policies and 
pr~Jjecrs. L ookin g back at W.W. l~oslow'~ th~~JretJc::l 
construction of the fi \ c essential Si.igcs of national ecoilon·.~~­
developmenr, Nigeria ha~ refust:>d to go bcyer.il ti 1e take-off age. 
~:nd lack o f continuity in le:1dership is lar.:~ely rf!S?Onsible. 
A not her problem is political wi! i :1nd .-:o:.J;age to con tin t:c. 
Some rLi)crs. i10 matter their belief in, ~nd co·mnitment to, policy 
regimes of their predecessors, may net be endowed '.vith much 
political wi II and lack the courage to continue the legacies. 
At this juncture, it is peninent to reflect on Obasanjo's 
po!Jcic~;- !Klil!cu!:J.rly his refonns ar.d :.1~k our.::;t:> lves ifrhr shoes h:~ 
will be n::mo\ ing in May wil l not be ove:·:;i zed for ·.vhoe\r::· 
succeeds him. Can anyone, even if he bdc!~?~S tcJ the ruling pan/. 
be able to d<:re a complex ar.d voiatile Ni§rinJ~ scx-iety <1nd C<UT) 
on OB.i's aggressively reforrnist policies? \Vill the opposition, if it 
happens to have succe0ded him, forpu!It:c2.! reasons, not brus!: 
asid~ all he he:s done so as to crJnsJgn Cb:.sc.'Jijo nr:d his lcg~<cies 
to the waste-bin of the past? Will rhos~ that h:.:vc :;!ora! a;;d 
financi:tl question marks ~gai ns~ their tHm~es in the EFCC ar:d 
ICPC records want any continuity? These a:·e salient matters th:lt 
may pose a challenge to a post-Obasanjo administration. 
The Philosophy Behind Obasanjo's Heorms 
For ai I of us, today is a duy to ce:P.i;•~te the f<lct 
that Nigc!ia has not only remained intaGt, but also· 
that :he nation i:~ getting s~rongcr, wi:h i:Etitutio::s 
:ha~ arc fi1mmg up, and a scx:icty t;· , ;~t i.;; r.o !ongf.;r 
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in despair because in many respects the future 
IS looking much brighter. 
-President Olusegun Obasanjo 
The above statement represents a fundamental premise 
that mformed Obasanjo's reforms. He also said: 
I mtend to use my mandate to provide quality 
leadership for all of Nigeria and for all Nigerians 
regardless of their political persuasions. Anything 
less would be unconstitutional , morally 
inadequate, and contrary to the wi II of God whose 
w1shes are my commands. Above all, in 
adherence to my leadership vision of a greater 
Nigeria, the only way to advance thi s country 
that belongs to all of us, is through solidarity and 
hard work. 
Obasanjo has never shied away from the fact that cohesion 
IS fundamental If any multinational state ac; Nigeria could pull down 
the vestiges of past mal-administration and join the league of 
developed countnes. Poised to challenge the staLUs quo that he 
met, Obasanjo affinned: 
We were fully conscious of the high expectations 
by wh1ch the rot would immediately be put to an 
end, our mfrastructure would reswTect from its 
ruins and our comatose public service would 
function again. 
From the foregoing, we could establish that the present 
administration met enonnous chal lenges that desired change and 
rose up to confront the challenges. As Obasanjo achieved the 
objects of reforms. he also engendered cenam landmarks in 
Nigena 's political history. It is to the eternal credit of hi s 
administration that Nigeria got debt pardon from its creditor-
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natiOns and international tinancial institutions. Added to this is the 
huge foreign reserve Nigeria was able to make despite the copiou!-> 
depletion and indebtedness by previous military administrations. 
Lots of stolen funds were recovered, pan of which was put in the 
country's cxtcmal reserves. 
The greater part of these lofty achievements was a 
culmination of his reforms. Let us examine these changes one 
after the other by appraising Obasanjo's policy regime from 1999 
to date. We will look at the initiatives, the implementation, success 
and loopholes in each of these reformist policies. 
Military Reforms 
The first institution that experienced refonns is the military. 
Since retuming to power as civilian President in 1999, Obasanjo 
overhauled the military, disengaging any officer who had held 
political postings in the military regimes led by Generals Sani 
Abacha, Ibrahim Babangida, Muhammadu Buhari and 
Abdulsalarni Abubakar. The administration considered this central 
to the rehabilitation of a nation that had been turned upside down 
by decades of military pillage, plunder and oppression; and for a 
country which had become the theatre for military adventurism 
and coups. Moreover, the reorganization was to restore 
professionalism and sanity in the over politicized institution. He 
also instal led a new cadre of military intelligence officers drawn 
primarily from the younger generation who had remained 
committed to professional tasks whi le the militruy poli ticians lasted 
111 power. 
However, some people considered the recent 300% 
increase in officers' salaries as outlandish and patronizing of the 
military, which may erode commitment and rather develop, in 
military circles, an unusual appetite for money and material 
rewards. 
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Executive Reforms 
President Obasanjo has made regular changes of his 
executrve, parucularly the think-tank of his reforms team. The 
changes have been likened to routine checks made in the clinic to 
ascertain and ensure the improvement in the health of patients. 
The routine chec"s on his executive were ro ensure that they do 
not become rusty. power drunk or spent of ideas. It was also an 
attempt to create vibrancy in the Learn as every one made efforts 
to do well in the face of a possible removal in a reshufne exercise 
that may come up. One remarkable example of changes made 
was the movement of the high-profile Finance Minister and former 
World Bank VJCc-Presrdent Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to the Foreign 
Affairs and fell ow· rcformerOby Ezekwesili from Solid Minerals 
to Education. The action was probably infom1ecl by the excellent 
score-sheet of thrs duo, which he wanted replicated in the two 
other areas. 
ln orderto assrst him in the executive tasks. he assembled 
some of the best men and women as ministers and members of 
the executrve councrl. The appointment critena were: ability, 
rntegrity, competence. shared vision and good character. The 
performance of all mrnrsters. who would have targets, would be 
carefully monrtorcd and assessed to ensure effect rve 
implementauon of rolrcies in their respcct1ve ministries. The 
structure of the Pres1dency was critically reviewed to 1nclude a 
monitoring unit that followed up and reported on the effective 
implementation of policy decisions. 
There 1s no doubt. that ObasanJo 's changes of his own 
executi ve and pres1dcncy were to reform executive power. but 
the anti-climax ofthrs was the head-on coll ision with his deputy. 
Thrs nft had untoward implication for Nigeria's political existence. 
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Economic Reforms 
This is perhaps one of the cmcial areas in which President 
Obasanjo's scorecard is enviable. The ongoing privatization 
advances considerably and government has been able to 
concentmte on its assignment of providing an enabling environment 
for optimal productivity in manufacturing. The government has 
encouraged small and medium scale industries, which have been 
attracting substantial amount of funds from commercial banks. It 
is evident that the industrial sector is now a vital segment for jobs 
and income for a large nurnberofNigeri ans. Privatization of the 
telecommunications sector has also revolutionized that industry, 
as it empowers even the less privileged and deve lops the 
information sector. However, there are certain drawbacks in the 
power sector and there are no visib le improvements in other 
privatized sectors such as the social services and tourism. The 
recapitali zation exercise and mergers in the banking sector is a 
fi rst. This has put paid to the mortality rate of banks, financial 
infidelity and losses incuJTed by millions of customers, which 
characterized the pre-reforms era. 
A vi tal component of the economic reforms dUJing the 
second term of President Obasanjo 's administration were ci vi I 
se rvice reform in the federal government, starting wi th the 
restructuring of fou r pilot ministries. These reforms were now 
being expanded to encompass the public sector more broadly, in 
order to tackle the erosion of capacity, organizational duplication, 
outdated mandates and overstaffing that had characterized the 
publi c sector in Nigeria forthe past two decades. 
In the oil and gas sector, there were more improvements 
during the Obasanjo years than in the previous thirty years. The 
quantum leap in this sector brought Nigeria closer to the target of 
earning substantial revenue from gas, in comparison to crude oi I. 
However, there is still the lack of functional oil refineries in Nigeria, 
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which explains the perenmal fuel scarcity and the importation of 
petroleum products at very prohibiti vc costs. 
ObasanJO himselfmcnlloned that the persistent drive to 
attract foreign imc~tment has resulted in an increase in the number 
of foreign investors who have either invested in the country or are 
planning to do so. The government could however encourage 
more of foreign direct investment, which has today launched India 
and the Asian Tigers to the forefront of economic advancement 
There have been markedly improved conditions of service 
for public sector employees. The private sector is also reporting 
significant increase in business activities and legitimate profits. 
Social Reforms 
In an address, President Obasanjo pointedly remarked 
that social systems are refo1med with the strong consideration 
that such social systems desperately needed to be rationalized 
and made wholesome. The administration identified as imperative, 
the need to restore the rule of law. According to Obasanjo: "Our 
soc1al institutions had to be firmly based on p1inciples of equality, 
justice and peaceful co-existence. We recognizcdlhat we must 
cnshri ne the ethics of transparency. accountabii ity and responsible 
leadership. And we also recognized that. in order to reduce povc11y 
and improve the quality of life. we had to put in place an economic 
regime that was efficient. productive and capable of delivering 
perceptible results.·· 
Statistics of social indices show considerable 
improvements in the quality or life. as measured by higher income 
and stronger purchasing power. The greatest gain of all is the 
increase in social capitaL as measured by the amount or faith and 
L1ust that citizens now have 111 their social system. 
In terms of infrastructure, the government embarked on 
what can be called a vigorous policy of investment in roads. energy 
130 
and water supply. This policy, as from 2004, began to yield 
noticeable results. The government started an aggressive policy 
of roads rehabilitation and constructiOn of new ones, with the 
view to improve transportation and ease the movement of goods 
throughout the country. The government also had the Intention of 
improving the quality of power supply and expanding output to at 
least 10,000 Megawatts by the end of 2007, in recognition of the 
need to industrialize. 
For the health sector, more resources were put into 
hospitals and healthcare deli very system, not just to improve but 
to stop preventable deaths and raise the national life expectancy. 
To this end, the University College Hospital (UCH), Ibadan and 
Lagos University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) got financial lifelines 
and material resources to bounce back to the primacy they were 
known for in the 1970s. 
In the education sector, the introduction ofthe Universal 
Basic Education (UBE) as a priority policy underlay the 
commitment to provide opp01tunity for the education of citizens. 
This was intended to develop their innate abilities and empower 
them to fully participate in the development of the country. On its 
completion, the UBE should allow the Nige1ian society to enjoy 
the p1ivilege of having in school, all children of school age. In its 
ref01m agenda, the Obasanjo administration planned to complete 
the refurbishment of the federal educational institutions at all levels 
in order to make them fully operational , qualitatively and 
quantitatively, so as to meet Nigeria's educational needs and skill 
development 
The agriculture sector continued to grow as a result of a 
policy to ensure food secu1ity through increased crop production, 
improved livestock husbandry as well as new marketing strategies 
for better returns for farmers. The administration pursued the 
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various strands of agncultural pollc1es v' 1th the ohjective of 
improving the level of food security. 
However. the social life of N1geria v' as man·cd by ethnic 
politics. conflicts and sectarian violence. The political scene\\ as 
almost hijacked h) groups, who politicized religion and started 
embarking on instlluting the Sharia as the state law in some states. 
There were also some very ugly episodes like the Odi, Zaki Biam, 
lfe-Modakeke and Niger Delta, that acted as encumbrances to 
the reform process. 
Anti-Corruption 
The anti-corruption crusade IS. perhaps. the most 
commended as it1s the most ,.iIi !'ied. Ohasanjo 's anti -COITuption 
regime was to engender a soctal org<.lllJsatJon that would be free 
ofcoruption and pen asi' e indisc1pline. By this, the citizens could 
dream of a restoratiOn of soc1al value'> and the reinstatement of 
self-pride. Comtption. fraud. and other financtal and economic 
crimes had etched so deep! y into the fab1ic of the nation and had 
terribly dented Nigena's image that the country no longer 
commanded any respect from the intcmational communtty. not 
even from the lln1cst Jnd poorest nallons of the world. The 
I ndependcnt Comtpt Pract1ccs and Other Related Offences Act 
(lCPC Act) and the Economtc and Financ1al Crimes Comm1ssion 
(EFCC) and the Due Process Act were the three means by \\'hich 
the govemment attempted to revamp the hope held hy many to 
rescue the nation from the edge of a prcctp1ce. 
The EFCC and ICPC ha\'C. ho\\ e' cr. come under severe 
anacks. particularly from scholars and politicians from the 
opposing camps. The greatest cnttcJsm is that the two agcnc1es 
are se lecuve and prejudic1altn their approach to cleantng the 
Augean Stable, that the targets arc opponents of the rul111g pany. 
Whateverthe misgtvings towards the anti-cotTuption bodies. the 
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twin-bodies have demonstrated government's ingenuity and 
doggedness in tack ling the legendary albatross of corruption in 
Nigc1ia. "ith ministers sacl\ed. govcmors removed, a police chief 
unseated and other hithe11o untouchable indi viduals exposed and 
demysti tied. 
Electoral Reforms 
There have been lots of criticisms against the electoral 
reforms of the administration. The reforms are seen to be clone 
largely in favour of the ruling pany. While the Independem National 
Electoral Commission (lNEC) is regarded as another political 
party in alliance with the ruling party. or an extension of the 
presidency doing its bidding, one cannot O\'crcmphasizc the novelty 
and success or the election t1ibunal in Nigeria. All over the world, 
elections manifest various degrees of imperfection.Jt is for this 
reason that the election ttibunals were Instituted as an avenue for 
all those who may have grievances to seck redress. The election 
ttihunals served to add credibility and faith to the electoral process. 
Political Constitution Reforms 
President Obasanjo instituted the Oputa Panel to look 
mto the many cases of Human Rights Violations and Other Related 
Matters from the beginning of military rule in Nigeria to 2003. 
This measure was a very welcome development as it attempted 
to redress all outstanding issues of military and govcmance high-
handedness that had exacerbated state-people hostilities and 
relations.lt was also to restore the people's faith and confidence 
in government. Fashioned after the Bishop Desmond Tutu-led 
Reconc iliation and Truth Commission in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the Oputa PaneL headed by Justice Chukwudifu Oputa 
and made up of credible Nigerians including Reverend Father 
Matthew Hassan Kukah, met in eli ffcrent parts of Nigeria and 
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allowed its offices to be mundated with pct1t10ns w1th the view to 
addressing the complamts of all agg1ievcd persons. However, 
the many cases that were tncdended up being mere public hcanngs 
that could accord no punishments or assuage the victim1zed; as 
several persons, including former military ruler, General Ibrahim 
Babangida defied and snubbed panel summons 
The administration has worked cooperatively with the 
National Assembly in attempting to guarantee press freedom. In 
the process of ensuring such, the Freedom of Information Act 
was initiated. A bill titled, "The Freedom oflnformation Bi II" 
introduced in 1999, was however, slowed down by soft 
opposition on account of the potential forthe law to grant foreigners 
access to sensitive information that might compromise natiOnal 
security. The law would guarantee joumalists access to govemment 
documents and records as well as enhance the right of the press 
to carry out their functions. 
Another notevvorthy legislative reform that has been 
mtroduced in Nigeria is the liberalization of the broadcast industry 
-a departure from the past when the industry was owned and 
controlled by the State. Liberalization of broadcast industry began 
in 1992 with the enactment of the ''Electronic Pri vatization 
Decree" 1992. The law empowers the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Commiss1on (NBC) to 1ssue licenses for pnvate broadcasting. 
Section 2(1 b) of the lm\ prov1des that the commiSSIOn wi II be 
responsible for "receiving, processing and conside1i ng applications 
for the ownership of radio and television stations including cable 
television services, direct satellite broadcast and any other medium 
of broadcasting." There has been an increase 111 the number of 
licenses since 1999. However, some of those stations that have 
succeeded in gomg on air are doing well. For example, Daar 
Communications (owners of Africa Independent Television/Ray 
Power) which pioneered private radio broadcasting in the country 
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now has broadcast facilities and structures in several c1t1es outside 
of Lagos. The cities include Port Harcourt, Kano, Jos, Gombe, 
Agenebode and Ogmi fo. 
To forestall the historical tendency of military intervention 
in Nige1ian politics, the Senate on November 15,2001, passed 
a bill that makes a coup d'etat a constitutional offence. The law 
punishes coup plotters with jail terms even when they are out of 
power. The bill titled, '1he Prohibition of Unconstitutional Take 
Over of Government," provides for a life jail sentence for anyone 
who participates in a forceful overthrow of the government. This 
is in addition to a 14-year jail sentence for anyone who serves in 
such ani !legally constituted government. The new law strengthens 
the provisions of Section 1 (2) of the 1999 Constitution which 
states that: "The Federal Republ ic of Nige1ia shall not be 
governed. nor shal l any person or group of persons take control 
of the Government of 0ligeria or any part thereof, except in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution." 
This constitutional reform is a milestone because it has 
potentially institutionalized and legalized civil disobedience against 
a forceful ove1throw of democratically elected govemments. It 
however, discourages members of the a1med forces from plotting 
coups as a strategy for leadership transition in Nigeria, and, 
therefore. helps the process of consolidating democracy and 
democratic norms such asci vi IIi bertics and fundamental human 
rights especially, freedom of expression. 
Local Government Reforms 
In respect of the local government reforms, the 
administration made spitited efforts to clear the rot at this level of 
the federal system. The Federal Govemment impounded funds 
meant for local governments in states that conducted elections in 
state-created local government areas. President Obasanjo also 
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decried the tampering and deducti on of funds mean t for loca l 
governments by state govemors in addition to other perceived 
distottions in managing local government funds. In the sweep of 
reforms at this level of government, seveml local government chiefs 
have been indic ted and remo ved after ICPC and EFCC 
investigations showed their culpability. 
In another sweep of local counci l reforms, the Obasanjo 
administration and the National Assembly reduced the tenure of 
elected local counci l officials as against four. This was against the 
backdrop of the idleness and development -clisorientation the local 
administration had rendered itself over time. 
It is very apposite to work out a tangible devolution of 
specific economic policies to the local govemments. The reason 
is simple. With little or nothing to do in economic policy 
management, local governments have only become fottresses for 
revenu~ allocation to ptivate pockets. As it is said, an idle mind is 
the devil's workshop. Since they cannot afford to build good 
roads, schools, hospitals. and the like, they simply share w hat is 
left after paying their usually over-bloated overhead costs. For 
example, I suggest that the local govemment counci Is should be 
made to manage such grassroots' based economic policies as 
the nation's agricultural policy. The task of ensuring the national 
goal of food security should be in their domain. The local 
governments can do thi s through the establishment of farm 
settlements based on the crops cultivatable in their areas. In doing 
thi s. the local governments can play a major role in SME 
development, job creation and ultimately reverse the 
mal distribution of wealth. This should attract a re view of the 
revenue allocation formula in favour of the local governments. 
The federal government can then set up mechanisms wi thin the 
Nattonal Planning Commission to assess the local governments 
and provide matching grants to the best performing ones in adclition 
136 
to their allocations from the federation account. The states can 
also follow suit. 
When practiced in its most elementary form. democracy 
helps to instill habits of transparency and accountability, wh ich 
eviscerates corruption . A good example can be found tn various 
town unions. M embers of town union executive commi ttees are 
usually elected in the freest democratic settings possible. Once 
elected and in office they stri ve to manage their affairs in as 
transparent a manner as is possible. Democracy in our local 
societies remains a bulwark against corruption and economic 
mismanagement. U ndoubtedly, bui lding democracy has its pains 
but in the long run . the gains make the process worth the while. 
As unttdy and difficult as the development of democratic traditions 
is, we must continue to be more willing to blunder in struggling for 
democracy. Oftentimes in a true democracy, the people may 
choose ten-i ble or mediocre personalities but such instances wil l 
ultimately be a scattering of excepti ons and not expectations to 
the rule. They wi ll eventually pale in significance. 
The Niger Delta 
The recent exclusive video documentaty of the dangerous 
activities of the militants by Cable News Network's Jeff Konainge 
and the April 14 andApri121 2007 militants' attacks on the police 
and fndependent National Electoral Commission (fNEC) clearly 
demonstrate the comprehensive failures in tackling the Niger Delta 
issue. Thi s probably exp lains the consideration of President 
Obasanjo to pick a Vice President of Niger Delta extraction , 
suggesting his admittance of the genuineness of the agitation by 
the people of Niger Delta. A lso, this probably infotmed the earlier 
speculated choice ofOdili, and indeed his choice ofGoodluck as 
Yar' Adua's running mate. Pertinently, it is a well considered view 
that the festering crises in the Niger Delta region , now threatening 
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the nation 's econom1c surv1 val could after all dictate that out of 
political expediency, a president of Niger Delta extraction 1s an 
automatic solution to the mil1tant agitation. wh1ch is really in the 
nation's best interest. 
Foreign Policy 
It is pent nent to mention that Nigeria 's foreign policy has 
been aggressively Africa-centred with enormous touch from 
Obasanjo himself. He has been radically disposed to good 
governance, democracy and poverty reduction, the attainment of 
the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) for Aftica and general 
economic development with minimal external control , but 
maximum foreign paittcipation that is Afiica-oiiented. 
The New Economic Partnership for Aftica's Development 
(NEPAD), one of the institutions initiated by Obasanjo and Mbekt 
of South Africa, has been the African Union's sustainable 
continental strategy for political and socio-economic redemption, 
through sound economic reforms, respect for human rights, 
investment in Indigenous human and material resources, 
environmental protection and international cooperation, based on 
shared values, peace, common secUJity and development. 
The African Union itself is moving ahead in its new mission 
of programmes for economic integration, together with measures 
towards economtc stability and unity. Nigena is in the forefront of 
actions to advance the progress of these programmes. 
Challenges of Continuity and the Way Out 
The greatest albatross in Obasanjo's reforms regime has 
been ethnic and religious conflict, followed by attempts to 
destabi lize the govemment by forces against anti-corruption, and 
then the Niger Delta crisis. There are more. These three could 
have made any regime without political will to collapse, without 
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completing its reforms programme. There are copious anti-
democratic and anti-Obasanjo forces that will frustrate any 
fUttherance of such programmes upon Obasanjo's exit. There 
are many forces that are only biding their time for Obasanjo to 
leave, in order to pull down the legacies for the purpose of pursuing 
their personal interests that had been stalled for quite a while. 
Several disgruntled individuals in the banking sector who were 
beneficiaries of the rot in the pre-capitalization era, who are waiting 
and working for the current reforms in that sector, to fai I. The 
reforms in the sectors thus face the grave chal lenge of intense 
pressure to fail and be pulled down, because they appear too 
radical for an already decadent system. 
The second problem is the availability of political will and 
courage to pursue such radical policies as anti-corruption and 
several others. Some people aver that it is only strong-wJ!Ied 
people such as Obasanjo that can carry out such radically 
rcfo1mist policies in Nigeria's social milieu. However, Obasanjo 
wi II not ahvays be there. But, after him, how do we preserve the 
legacies and programmes of re-engineering he is leaving behind'? 
Does a PDP government mean the same thing as Obasanjo's 
strong will? Does an AC or AD or ANPP government 
automatically translate to continuity? 
No. For the PDP, it wi II be a matter of principles and 
personal convictions of the next leader. It is a matter of political 
wi II , courage and fearlessness. For other parties, it has to be a 
matter of the good of the whole, it docs not have to be politicized: 
what is good is good and should be allowed to continue. For all, 
it is a matter of godliness and trust in God who can do all things. 
The Scriptures tell us that without Him, we can do nothing. It is a 
matter of pattiotism and passionate, unrepentant love for Nigeria. 
Finally, when the drawbacks in the ongoing sectoral 
reforms are taken care of by the next administration, there is the 
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ilkciJhood of greater popularity for the changes. and by extension, 
a neutralizing effect on subterTanean or actual moves to frustrate 
the programmes. 
Thus, v. hat can assure continuity. stall military or extra-
democratic rntervcn tron after Obasanjo, is for hi~ successor to 
COITect the anomalies in the ongoing refollTis and general policy 
administration of the present dispensation. Such a successor must 
be strong-wil led, undaunted, courageous, innovative, de-
poli ticized and godly. The political class must put Nigeria first in 
all their calculations and allow the refo11T1s to out! i ve Obasan jo 
wi thout bringing ethnic, religious or ideological sentiments to it. 
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The African Union and the Peace Process in 
Darfur 
By 
Saka Lug man * 
Introduction 
Whi le the United Nations has come to reali ze the great 
danger of inaction in the face of threats to peace and security 
a1ising from contlict, the organizati on is fi nding the need to muster 
adequate political will and resources needed for inLervention. More 
and more the organization is failing to halt the spread of violence, 
conflicts and their attendant humani tmian disasters. Worst sti II , 
this is happening when expectations about the organization's roles 
in preventing conflict. promoting peace and security and enhancing 
sustainable human development are high. 
Notwithstanding its glaring foot-dragging in the face of 
threats to peace and secUiity, the UN and most imp011antly the 
United Nations Security Council, remains the world 's most 
important body charged with the task of maintaining international 
peace and security. Since the 1990s acti vities ranging from 
* Saka Lugman is wi th the Department of Poli tical Sc1ence, University of 
Ilorin, P.M.B. 1515, Ilorin, Nigeria 
14 1 
'\ 
\ 
